should provide insights about the strength of the prosecutor's powers in practice and the prospects for future compliance with the ICC's proprio motu investigations-namely, those investigations that the prosecutor is empowered to commence without waiting for a state or United Nations Security Council referral. To the extent that the evidence shows an ICC without strong enforcement powers in practice, this timely study should aid policy makers and states in finding ways to ensure that this new institution can make the positive contribution to international justice its creators intended it to make. This Article describes Kenya's commitment to the ICC and the subsequent ICC investigation into the Kenyan situation. The next section outlines the literature addressing the design of international human rights law treaties and their effectiveness in inducing compliance and positively influencing behavior. The Article then turns to describing methodology and examining the evidence of compliance (or lack thereof) with treaty terms and demands in the context of the ICC's case against Kenya. The Article concludes with some observations about the evidence and its implications regarding the ICC's enforcement powers.
II.

BACKGROUND: KENYA AND THE ICC
Kenya signed the ICC treaty on August 11, 1999, under the leadership of long-time authoritarian President Daniel arap Moi. 10 It ratified the treaty in 2005, only three years after the election of President Mwai Kibaki-a politician who ran on a platform promising democratic reforms. 11 When Kenya joined the court, it was still a country plagued by poor human rights practices and weak domestic law enforcement institutions. It also joined knowing that it had a Only a couple of short years after ratification, however, Kenya erupted into ethnicallycharged violence in the aftermath of its presidential elections. More than 1,000 people died -and some 300,000 were displaced -during the violence that occurred after Kibaki allegedly rigged election results which voting tallies had suggested were favoring his opponent, Raila Odinga. 18 To break the country's cycle of impunity surrounding post-election violence, the report recommended establishing a Special Tribunal in Kenya to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate the identified alleged crimes. 19 The Commission gave Kofi
Annan a list of names to forward to the ICC in the event the Special Tribunal processes did not proceed. 20 The Special Tribunal was never created. Hours before the initial deadline to send the list of names to the ICC, the government signed a bill to start the legislative process necessary to create the tribunal. 21 However, the bill was later rejected by parliament. 22 The deadline to turn over the [ For instance, scholars adhering to a realist tradition argue that international law has little effect on a state's human rights practices. 33 Instead, states act rationally and are guided by selfinterest. They may improve their human rights practices, but not because a treaty requires them to do so. As Jana von Stein argued, treaties may screen out potentially bad and noncompliant members, rather than induce them to join and thereafter alter their behavior to conform to treaty terms.
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Other literature is more optimistic about the effects of treaty commitment. Scholars doing normative research emphasize states' innate "propensity to comply" with the agreements they sign.
According to this theory, states genuinely wish to embrace change, and formal treaties provide them with the channels through which they may exercise this propensity. Thus, the institution acts to constrain state behavior because the states themselves are seeking a mechanism by which to commit to change. Finally, the Kenya case also provides a good test of the institutionalist hand-tying theory.
Kenya was in a democratic transition at the time it joined the court, and examining the postcommitment evidence can help show whether its actions are consistent with some other domestically-driven movement for positive change relating to protections against human rights abuses. In particular, we can assess not only whether the ICC influenced any positive changes in behavior, but also whether any such changes were influenced by the type of strong civil society 44 
V. METHODOLOGY: DEFINING COMPLIANCE
This case study examines Kenya's actions and facts surrounding its interaction with the ICC in an effort to find evidence of whether the ICC's ostensibly strong enforcement powers are as strong in practice as they seem to be on paper. In doing so, it considers several aspects of positive influence and compliance that directly relate to the ICC's overarching goal of ending impunity for mass atrocities, as well as its processes for achieving that goal.
(a) Kenya's human rights record before and after ICC ratification. 47 Commentators, however, suggest the partnership was a logical outcome of the ICC processes: a way for Kenyatta and Ruto to defeat both Odinga and the ICC prosecutor. 48 First, the two successfully defeated a case commenced by some local non-profits in Kenya, which argued that the men should not be able to run for office because the ICC indictments showed that they did not meet new Constitutional requirements which called for public officials to have integrity. 49 Kenyatta and Ruto were also successful in their presidential bid, using rhetoric about the supposed politically-motivated nature of the ICC proceedings to rally the support of their respective communities' support (Kenyatta is Kikuyu and Ruto is Kalenjin). 50 In short, the ICC indictments drove two staunch rivals to work together and to get their followers to do the same.
Not only did the ICC apparently contribute to the alliance, but it also seems to have played a large role in the peacefulness of the 2013 elections. The court went on record and warned the ICC suspects that it was prepared to issue new arrest warrants if the suspects were found making dangerous speeches that preached hatred and violence within Kenya. During a 2011 court appearance, an ICC presiding judge said that she had read "newspaper reports to the effect that some of the suspects are engaging in hate speech which could occasion fresh chaos" and that such speeches "could be interpreted as inducement to violate the conditions set by the court and which include that the suspects should not commit fresh crimes within the jurisdiction of the court." 51 At least one commentator has argued that these warnings seem to have made a positive impact, with
Kenyatta and Ruto only soon thereafter preaching peace and reconciliation before the upcoming election to a domestic audience. 52 Reports in a Kenyan paper state that the leaders' message was a strong break from the combative statements the two had been issuing before their initial appearance in The Hague the week before. 53 Apparently, Kenyatta and Ruto continued to preach peace: news reports show that only one week before the 2013 elections, they and Odinga appeared at a prayer rally, all promising to promote non-violent elections. 54 That the ICC played a significant role in contributing to Kenya's peaceful elections seems clearer when one considers other alternative explanations for the outcome. First, the evidence does not suggest that Kenyatta and Ruto were pandering to the West and preaching peace so as to obtain aid or trade or other relations. News reports indicated that the west was hoping Odinga would win the elections, and Britain stated that if Kenyatta won, it would be limiting relations with him because of his ICC indictment. 55 Western states did warn Kenya that elections should be peaceful, but Kenyatta derisively dismissed those warnings. He retorted that Kenya is not keen on Western [Vol 26:1 interference and that others, like China, are interested in business relations with Kenya. 56 One cannot contribute the peace to domestic institutional changes alone. Kenya did adopt a new constitution in 2010. 57 Some reports suggested that this new constitution contributed to more peaceful elections because it provided for an independent judiciary to preside over election results.
As such, members of the public could feel more assured than in the past that election results would not be fraudulently manipulated by a powerful few. 58 Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the ICC helped make that new constitution a reality. Although Kibaki's presidential promises included delivering a new constitution, the initial constitution he proposed only months after committing to the ICC in 2005 was overwhelmingly rejected because it continued to vest all powers in the executive. 59 The new constitution providing for a more decentralized political system minimizing presidential power and increasing judicial independence was only delivered in 2010. 60 In sum, there is reason to conclude that the ICC and its enforcement powers positively impacted Kenya's human rights practices by aiding in deterring an election accompanied by widespread violence. This is especially so as Kenyatta and Ruto were both associated with the authoritarian Moi regime and were viewed in the past as fueling divisive tribal politics-as opposed to unity politics. Chamber, however, found that Kenya had not commenced any domestic proceedings against persons bearing the greatest responsibility for the violence, but instead had commenced only a limited number of cases for minor crimes, such as for theft or housebreaking. 62 The Appeals
Chamber later upheld the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision. 63 Recent reports indicate that Kenya's government has still made no real efforts to establish domestic mechanisms to deliver justice to victims of the post-election violence by holding perpetrators accountable. 64 As of 2014, only twenty-four suspects had been convicted out of more than 6,000 cases that had been pending for potential domestic prosecution. 65 Moreover, in February 2014, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions declared that 4,000 cases were being dropped as they were impossible to prosecute. 66 In 2008, the government established a Truth [Vol 26:1 the functioning of its judiciary and police. 77 And there are reasons to believe the presence of the ICC is, at least in part, responsible for prompting these developments. 78 As noted above, although Kenya was on an apparent path towards democratizing with the election of Kibaki, the key constitutional component was only implemented well after the commencement of the ICC processes. 79 Similarly, although Kenya could have passed a domestic law criminalizing the ICC crimes before or at the time of its ratification, it only did so after the world community threatened to step in with an ICC case after the 2008 post-election violence.
These positive developments, however, do not change that in practice, as opposed to on paper, Kenya's culture of impunity-at least as to those in power-seems little changed. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The evidence outlined above does suggest that the ICC's enforcement powers in practice are not strong enough to compel compliance with either treaty terms or individual court orders.
Kenya continues to generally adhere to a culture of impunity. Further, Kenya, for the most part, seems to have managed to keep the ICC from obtaining the evidence it needed to proceed against some of the suspects. This means that some individuals who have allegedly committed crimes against humanity will go free and will not face justice. Thus, in some respects, the Kenya case study confirms what other studies have concluded; that international human rights treaties are not necessarily effective at constraining states that commit human rights abuses such that they are induced to comply with treaty terms.
However, the case study has also produced some evidence consistent with the studies that suggest the ICC may have a more positive influence on state conduct than treaties with weaker enforcement mechanisms. Most importantly, the evidence indicates that the ICC played a significant role in producing elections in 2013 that were generally peaceful and not accompanied by the kind of ethnically-charged violence that has historically accompanied Kenyan elections.
Specifically, the evidence shows that Kenyatta and Ruto preached peace after the ICC judge went on the record reminding them that hate speech could lead to additional charges. Recall that Bosco may be right, but does this mean that the proprio motu power is so damaged that it cannot be a useful tool to demand compliance with treaty terms and positively impact behavior in the future? This Article concludes that there are reasons to answer this question in the negative.
First, the Kenya case was the prosecutor's first use of proprio motu powers, and moreover, the court itself is in its infancy. It is bound to have some growing pains. It can learn from its experiences and seek out ways to insure its tools are more effective in the future. Second, as
Professor Karen Alter argues, even if Kenyatta did write the manual on impunity, not all leaders will have the same "skill or political cache to carry off a repeat story." 99 Among other things, Kenyatta is the son of Kenya's first president, groomed from childhood for political office, and his family's business empire is so large that it can influence the personal future of many Kenyans (for 97 Bosco, supra note 83. 98 Id. 99 Alter, supra note 84.
